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摘要
本文在一個耐久財的寡占市場中引進策略性租賃聯盟。 在第一期期初, 效率較低
的製造廠商與一個租賃業者聯盟, 雙方簽訂契約, 由租賃業者先決定耐久財的最
適出租數量, 再由聯盟的製造業者決定向對方收取的固定費用與價格。 本文發現
在特定的條件下, 此種策略性租賃聯盟不但可以增加效率較低的製造廠商之獲利,
甚至可扭轉寡占市場的優劣態勢, 使之成為市場贏家。
關鍵詞: 策略聯盟; 耐久財; 租賃; 動態寡占
Abstract
In this paper, we incorporate a strategic leasing alliance into a durable goods
duopoly. In the alliance, the inefficient manufacturer and the allied renter
write a contract at the beginning of period 1. The renter chooses the optimal
volume of leasing, while the inefficient manufacturer decides upon a fixed
fee and unit price. We show that under certain condition, strategic leasing
alliance could increase the inefficient manufacturer’s profits and even make
it to be a winner in the duopoly.
Keywords: strategic alliance, durable goods, leasing, dynamic duopoly
JEL classification: L13; L24; M31
1. Introduction
In a dynamic asymmetric duopoly, could an inefficient firm increase profits
by creating a strategic leasing alliance? This question is a matter of great
concern to all duopolists producing durable goods. In fact, since the 1990s,
the strategic alliance has become one of the business strategic choices. There
have been many forms of strategic alliances; some are successful, whereas
some were dissolved. Strategic alliances have gained increasing interests from
academic as well. However, most management literature discusses mainly
on the formations of various alliances, and studies collaboration in certain
industries. The few economic literature, concentrating on R&D cooperation,
deals with the issues including optimal coalition structure and the interaction
between R&D and product market decisions.1 Hence, the literature only
exhibits partial features of strategic alliances, and leaves some gaps to be
filled out.
In a durable goods market, leasing allows a firm to capture part of de-
mand by providing commodity services to those consumers who can not
afford the price or need the services only during a part of life span of the
commodity. In addition, once the leasing contract is due, a firm can resell
the leased goods with no production costs. Although leasing is less attrac-
tive in a competitive market as pointed out by Saggi and Vettas (2000), we
conjecture that there are possibilities for an inefficient firm to increase profits
by adopting the strategy of sales-leasing mixture.
It is recognized that leasing needs some specific skills (e.g. access to
customer, rental contract negotiation), that manufacturers lack so that they
have incentives to cooperate with renters in pursuit of the benefits of spe-
cialization. In this paper, we want to show that under certain conditions an
inefficient duopolist of durable goods, playing the role of a leader in a leasing
alliance, could not only improve its earning ability, but also become a winner
in the market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
1See Kamien et al. (1922) and Cabral (2000) for the survey of early literature. There
is also a set of papers that analyze the effects of R&D cooperation on product market
competition, including Bloch (1995, 1996), Gaudet and Salant (1991), Morasch (2000),
Shaffer (1995), and so on.
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describe the basic model and present the analysis. In Section 3, a strate-
gic leasing alliance is incorporated into the model. Section 4 compares the
market outcomes between the basic sales competition and the sales-leasing
mixture. A numerical example will also be presented. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2. A basic model
2.1 The model
There is a durable good which lasts for two periods. In each period, the
demand for the service of the good is:
rt = a− bqt, t = 1, 2, (1)
where rt is the one-period price in period t, qt is the total stock of the good
available in period t, and a, b > 0. For analytic simplicity, the good is
assumed to be perfectly durable.
There are two firms, A and B, each incurs a cost per unit cj, j = A,B.
Firm A is assumed to be more efficient than firm B, that is cA < cB. No
fixed cost is incurred by each firm. In the basic model, each firm simply sells
the product to maximize the present value of profits. The Cournot quantity
competition is undertaken in each period.
2.2 Analysis
Beginning with the selling problem in period 2. The selling price p2 in this
period is equal to r2, which is given by p2 = a− b(
∑
j s
j
1 +
∑
j s
j
2), where s
j
t
is the units sold by firm j in period t. Firm j maximizes the second-period
profits, pij2 = (p2 − cj)sj2, by choosing the optimal sales sj2. This yields
sj∗2 =
a− b(sA1 + sB1 )− 2cj + c−j
3b
, j,−j = A,B, j 6= −j. (2)
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Based on this choice, we can calculate the selling price p∗2 and each firm’s prof-
its pij∗2 as functions of cost parameters {cA, cB} and previous sales {sA1 , sB1 }.
In period 1, firm j chooses sales sj1 to maximize profits over the two-
period horizon:
max pij = (p1 − cj)sj1 + δpij∗2
where p1 = r1 + δp
∗
2,
and r1 = a− b
∑
j s
j
1.
(3)
δ is a one-period discount factor common to consumers and firms, δ ∈ (0, 1).
The Cournot equilibrium quantities of sales are given by:
sj∗1 =
(9 + δ)(3 + δ)a− 9(6− 3δ − δ2)cj + (27− 12δ − δ2)c−j
b(27 + 5δ)(3 + δ)
. (4)
Through substitutions, the optimal quantities for the second period and the
optimal prices are derived as follows:
sj∗2 =
(3 + δ)a− 3(5 + 2δ)cj + (12− δ)c−j
b(27 + 5δ)
, (5)
p∗1 =
(3 + δ)2a+ (9 + 4δ − δ2)(cA + cB)
27 + 5δ
, (6)
p∗2 =
(2 + δ)(3 + δ)a− (3− 5δ + δ2)(cA + cB)
27 + 5δ
. (7)
Note that first, the selling price is higher in the first period than the level
of the second period. Second, the efficient (low cost) firm sells more in each
period than the inefficient (high cost) firm. As a result, the efficient firm
earns more profits than the inefficient firm does.
3. Strategic leasing alliance
In the previous section, the duopolists in a durable-good market sell their
products to consumers directly. We now consider the case of the inefficient
firm (firm B) that adopts a mixed strategy of sales and leasing to overcome
the competition disadvantage. Lacking of renting skills, the manufacture
reaches for the service of leasing by cooperating with a renter (firm R).
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The game has three stages: one strategic leasing alliance stage in period
1 and two sales stage in the whole life span. In the first stage the inefficient
firm establishes an alliance with a renter to lease some of its products. The
inefficient manufacturer is assumed to play the role of a Stackelberg leader
in the alliance. The renter chooses the quantity of products to lease in the
market, while the allied manufacturer, taking into account the reaction of the
renter, decides a lump sum fee and a constant price in payment for the rental
products. In the second stage the two manufacturers decide simultaneously
on their sales in the first period. In the third stage, the allied manufacturer,
having the option of selling the leased goods, plays a Cournot game with the
efficient manufacturer on sales in the second period.
3.1 Final sale stage
We begin the third stage where the two manufacturers decide noncoopera-
tively on their outputs. The selling price faced by the two firms in this case is
p2 = a− b(
∑
j s
j
1+
∑
j s
j
2). The inefficient firm may provide new products in
addition to the stock units leased. Let lB1 denotes the units supplied by firm
B for lease through firm R in the previous period. The decision problem for
manufacturer j is to choose the optimal sales to maximize its second period’s
profits. The profit function of firm A is just as the one in the basic model.
The profit function of firm B is
piB2 = (p2 − cB)sB2 + cBlB1 , if sB2 > lB1 ,
= p2s
B
2 , otherwise. (8)
Here we implicitly assume that the leased goods are freely disposed. Thus,
if sB2 < l
B
1 , then firm B earns total revenue. There are two possible sets
of solutions: one is with positive outputs for both firms; the other is with
positive output only for the efficient firm. Based on each set of solutions, we
solve onward the other stages of game. We find that the subgame perfect
equilibrium is unique, and in equilibrium the inefficient manufacturer just
sells out part of goods leased before without new production in the second
period. For the sake of brevity, the inappropriate solutions are not reported
here. As a result, the optimal sales in this stage are given by
sA∗2 =
a− b(sA1 + sB1 )− 2cA
3b
, (9)
sB∗2 =
a− b(sA1 + sB1 ) + cA
3b
. (10)
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Since the optimal choice for the inefficient firm in the last period is to resell
out used goods, the volumes of sales of both firms have no direct relationship
with the unit cost of the inefficient firm.
3.2 First sale stage
Substituting sj∗2 (j = A,B) into the price equation yields p
∗
2 = (a+c
A−bs1)/3,
where s1 is total sales in period 1. Likewise, the equilibrium profits pi
j∗
2 (j =
A,B) are derived as the functions of {cA, s1}. The selling price in the first
period is the sum of all one-period prices in the life span, that is (r1 + δp
∗
2).
The rental price is given by r1 = a− b(
∑
j s
j
1 + l
B
1 ).
In this stage, each firm chooses quantity of sales in the first period, given
the units leased. Joining leasing alliance, the high-cost manufacturer has
two potential revenue sources in the first period: sales revenue and revenue
from renting. Let z ≡ {sA1 , sB1 }. The present values of profits of the two
manufacturers can be written as functions of z:
piA = (p1(z)− cA)sA1 + δpiA∗2 (z), (11)
piB = (p1(z)− cB)sB1 + (wB1 − cB)lB1 + fB1 + δpiB∗2 (z), (12)
where wB1 is the price per unit and f
B
1 is a lump sum fee payable by the allied
renter. Maximizing the present values of profits and simultaneously solving
the two first order conditions yield the Cournot equilibrium quantities of
sales:
sA∗1 =
(9 + δ)(3 + δ)a− 9(6− 3δ − δ2)cA + 3(9 + δ)cB − 9b(3 + δ)lB1
b(27 + 5δ)(3 + δ)
,
(13)
sB∗1 =
(9 + δ)(3 + δ)a+ (27− 12δ − δ2)cA − 6(9 + 2δ)cB − 9b(3 + δ)lB1
b(27 + 5δ)(3 + δ)
.
(14)
It is worth note that once the high-cost manufacturer establishes a leasing
alliance with a rental firm, it will induce both manufacturers to reduce sales
to maintain the selling price high in the first period. Substituting sA∗1 and
sB∗1 into the function of rental price yields r1 as follows:
r∗1 =
3(3 + δ)a− b(9 + 5δ)lB1 + (9− 8δ)cA + 9cB
27 + 5δ
. (15)
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3.3 Leasing alliance stage
In this stage firm B and firm R engage in leasing cooperation. Firm R being
a sole renter orders the units for lease from the allied manufacturer and pays
a price wB1 per unit as well as a lump sum fee f
B
1 . The leasing business incurs
a fixed cost kR1 . Its profit is pi
R
1 = (r1−wB1 )lB1 − fB1 − kR1 . The renter chooses
optimal lB1 to maximize profits. This yields
lB∗1 =
3(3 + δ)a+ (9− 8δ)cA + 9cB − (27 + 5δ)wB1
27 + 5δ
. (16)
It is obvious that the quantity of leasing is increasing with the unit costs
of duopolists, while decreasing with the price paid by the renter. Sub-
stituting lB∗1 respectively into the equilibrium quantities of sales, prices,
and duopolists’ profits in each period, we can express all as functions of
{cA, cB, w1}.
Based on the renter’s optimal choice, the manufacture B solves the fol-
lowing problem:
max piB = (p∗1 − cB)sB∗1 + (wB1 − cB)lB∗1 + fB1 + δpiB∗2
s.t. piR1 ≥ 0. (17)
For a Stackelberg leader, the participation constraint is binding. The optimal
unit price and fixed fee payable by the renter are derived as follows:
wB∗1 =
1
(27 + 5δ)∆
[(3 + δ)(729 + 486δ − 27δ2 − 20δ3)a+ (8748
+15066δ + 8289δ2 + 1740δ3 + 125δ4)cB + (2187− 486δ
−1701δ2 − 228δ3 + 20δ4)cA], (18)
fB∗1 =
9 + 5δ
4b(27 + 5δ)∆2
[(243 + 405δ + 165δ2 + 19δ3)a− (486
+783δ + 258δ2 + 25δ3)cB + (243 + 108δ − 195δ2 − 44δ3)cA]2
−kR1 , (19)
where ∆ = (3 + δ)(162 + 153δ + 25δ2).
The unit price is positive and increasing with the upstream manufacturer’s
cost. On the contrary, the fixed fee is decreasing with the upstream man-
ufacturer’s cost. It is easy to show that if cB/cA < (486 + 324δ − 42δ2 −
20δ3)/(3(81 + 54δ + 5δ2) < 2, then wB1 > c
B. This implies that if the in-
efficiency of the allied manufacturer is slight, it will charge its downstream
renter a price higher than its unit cost.
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Through the process of substitutions, the equilibriums of leasing market
are given as follows:
r∗1 =
1
2∆
[(243 + 297δ + 105δ2 + 11δ3)a+ (486 + 675δ + 258δ2 + 25δ3)cB
+9(27− 19δ2 − 4δ3)cA], (20)
lB∗1 =
1
2b∆
[(243 + 405δ + 165δ2 + 19δ3)a− (486 + 783δ + 258δ2 + 25δ3)cB
+(243 + 108δ − 195δ2 − 44δ3)cA]. (21)
Likewise, the equilibriums of sales market in both periods can be derived
as follows:
p∗1 =
1
2∆
[(243 + 459δ + 339δ2 + 101δ3 + 10δ4)a+ (486 + 675δ + 222δ2
+25δ3)cB + (243 + 486δ + 279δ2 − 6δ3 − 10δ4)cA], (22)
sA∗1 =
1
2b∆
[(243 + 270δ + 93δ2 + 10δ3)a+ 3(162 + 171δ + 25δ2)cB
−9(81 + 21δ − 46δ2 − 10δ3)cA], (23)
sB∗1 =
9 + 5δ
2b∆
[(27 + 15δ + 2δ2)a− 3(18 + 5δ)cB + (27− 6δ − 2δ2)cA],
(24)
p∗2 =
1
∆
[(81 + 117δ + 45δ2 + 5δ3)a− 18δcB + (243 + 225δ + 15δ2 − 5δ3)cA],
(25)
sA∗2 =
1
b∆
[(81 + 117δ + 45δ2 + 5δ3)a− 18δcB − 3(81 + 132δ + 71δ2 + 10δ3)cA],
(26)
sB∗2 =
1
b∆
[(81 + 117δ + 45δ2 + 5δ3)a− 18δcB + (243 + 225δ + 15δ2 − 5δ3)cA].
(27)
Once the rental price is higher than the inefficient manufacturer’s unit cost,
the duopolists will be induced to set the selling price in the first period
above the manufacturer’s unit cost also. This supports Burlow (1982)’s ar-
gument that leasing is a possible solution to the Coase problem associated
with durable goods.2
With the pressure for better performance from revenue, the inefficient
manufacturer seeks a leasing alliance to avoid direct competition with its
2See Tirole (1988) for the review of the Coase problem in durable goods.
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rival. The way of cooperation in this alliance is that the manufacturer spe-
cializes on production and provides the products to its allied for lease. As
a Stackelberg leader in this alliance, the upstream manufacturer makes a
contract as depicted in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If the manufacturer’s unit cost is slightly high, the price it
charges the renter is above its unit cost, while setting a fixed fee to extract all
excess profits of the rental firm.
4. Comparisons
In this section the market performance of asymmetric duopoly with one
strategic leasing alliance is compared with the results of pure Cournot sales
competition. Since the analysis is complex, we first consider the case of sym-
metric duopoly so as to obtain clear identifications of the effects of leasing
alliance. With algebraic manipulations, we find the following comparison
results:
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, (a) p1n > p1; (b) s
A
1n > s
A
1 ; (c) s
B
1n > s
B
1 ; (d)
sB2n < s
B
2 ; (e) pi
A
1n > pi
A
1 ; (f) pi
B
2n < pi
B
2 ; and (g) pi
A
n > pi
A.
To simplify the notation, we omit the superscript ∗. The subscript n
is used to indicate the initial situation without leasing alliance. First, the
establishment of leasing market lowers the current selling price. While leasing
through a specialized renter allows the allied manufacturer to capture some
demand, its sales volume in the current period decreases. However, the
leasing business is beneficial to enlarge the second-period sales. With the
threat of leasing, the sales volume for the competitor being reduced, together
with the decline of the selling price, the competitor’s current and lifetime
profits all decrease. With regard to the allied manufacturer itself, its profits
in the second period is more than that in the initial state. Moreover, if the
fixed cost for the renter is not to high so that the allied manufacturer receives
enough fee, then its lifetime profits also increase.
Next turn to the case of asymmetric duopoly. The following proposition
summarizes the unambiguous results of comparison of sales volumes.
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Proposition 3. In equilibrium, (a) sB1n > s
B
1 , and (b) s
B
2n < s
B
2 .
The influence of the formation of leasing alliance on the inefficient allied man-
ufacturer’s sales are the same as in the symmetric duopoly case. Besides, it
can be shown that the allied manufacturer’s second period volume of sales
and profits are greater than those of its efficient competitor. The aggregate
welfare effect of this strategic leasing alliance to the inefficient manufacturer
depends on the market demand, the cost difference between the two man-
ufacturers, and the fixed cost of renting. The larger the market demand,
or the higher (lower) the efficient (inefficient) manufacturer’s unit cost, or
the lower the fixed rental cost, the more possible that the leasing alliance is
beneficial to the inefficient firm.
For illustration, let’s consider a numerical example. Following Saggi and
Vettas (2000), set a = 80, b = 2, cA = 7, cB = 8, and δ = 0.8. In the situation
of pure sales competition, p∗1n = 42.86 and p
∗
2n = 15.23. The stream of sales
volumes are sA∗1n = 12.42, s
A∗
2n = 4.11, s
B∗
1n = 12.24, and s
B∗
2n = 3.61. The
lifetime profit for firm A is 472.52, of which piA∗1n = 445.46 and pi
A∗
2n = 33.83,
while the lifetime profit for firm B is 447.50, of which piB∗1n = 426.61 and
piB∗2n = 26.11.
With the leasing alliance, the market outcomes are as follows. Suppose
that the fixed cost of the renter kR is equal to 20. In the contract of the
leasing alliance, wB∗1 = 15.60, f
B∗
1 = 63.42, and l
B∗
1 = 9.97. The one-period
price and the selling prices are r∗1 = 23.96, p
∗
1 = 37.54, and p
∗
2 = 16.97.
Comparing with the situation without leasing alliance, the selling price in
the first period declines, while the selling price in the second period rises
due to the strategic disposal of some used goods. The sales of the allied
manufacturer in the first period decreases to 8.09, and increases significantly
to 8.49 in the last period, just as what we show in the theoretical model.
Similarly, the sales of the efficient firm decrease first and increase later in
this example; the volumes are sA∗1 = 9.96 and s
A∗
2 = 4.99. With sales-leasing
mixture, the allied firm obtains profits equal to 378.14 in the first period
and 144 in the second period, respectively. The total profit for the allied
manufacturer is 493.34, greater than the level with sales only. The profits for
the efficient manufacturer are piA∗1 = 304.08 and pi
A∗
2 = 49.70. In total, the
efficient firm earns only 343.84 in the whole life span, not only less than the
level with sales only, but also being surpassed by the inefficient competitor.
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This leads to the following:3
Proposition 4. When the fixed rental cost is low enough, a strategic leasing
alliance could help the high cost firm to achieve the higher level of profit.
The critical level is determined by the size of market demand and the cost
difference between duopolists.
5. Conclusions
This paper introduces the strategic leasing alliance into a durable goods
duopoly to show that cooperating with an efficient renter is a possible way
for a high-cost manufacturer to overcome the sales disadvantage. We find
that taking the position of leader in the leasing alliance, the allied manu-
facturer seizes the extra profit of renting. If the cost difference between the
two manufacturers is slight, then the benefits from leasing is large. On the
other hand, the resell of the leased goods in the final period depressing the
sales of the competitor generates a great amount of profits for the allied
manufacturer.
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